

## **Abstract**

The issue of Boko Haram in Nigeria has become a threat to both internal and international security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, media houses as well as international bodies such as the United Nations. With the increased numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombing and well-organised guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram's challenge to the Nigerian state now also stretches across the entire 36 states of Nigeria, thus affecting its economic and social-political growth. With an aim of finding a solution that could lead to success in fending off the Boko Haram insurgency, this thesis explores the economic and political-cum-military forces at play between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram. It tries to investigate the apparatus of counterinsurgency earlier employed by the Nigerian state, thus also seeking to explain the possible counterproductive result or failure of counterinsurgency.

The conclusion of this thesis offers framework for rethinking counterinsurgency, thus arguing that counterinsurgency has the propensity of leading to a classical state of terrorism. It is also suggested that avoiding situations that could lead to insurgency is better than trying to counter one. This thesis thus suggests social-political and economic reforms as well as amnesty programmes as measures if heavily invested in, to help curb Boko Haram as well as insurgency in general.

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## **Abbreviations**

CCTV- Closed Circuit Television Camera

COIN – Counterinsurgency

GTD- Global Terrorism Database

FM 3-24 - Field Manual No.3-24

U.S.C. - United States Code

EFCC- The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (of Nigeria)